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Abstract
The Orthodox Church has been intimately wrapped up in the Russian state since
Russia’s conversion to Christianity in 988. The relationship between the two is most
succinctly wrapped up in Tsar Nicholas I’s so-called triad: “Orthodoxy, Autocracy, and
Nationality.” This paper seeks to explain the manner in which the Orthodox Church
reasserted itself as a force in Russian politics after the collapse of the Soviet Union in
1991 up through the first administration of President Vladimir Putin. The church under
Patriarch Alexy powerfully reinserted itself into affairs of state during the August 1991
coup attempt, while its relationship with the state after the independence of Russian
Federation was driven far more by the government. The 1997 law on religious freedom
represented a sea change in the collaboration between church and state, paving the way
for much more open collaboration in domestic and foreign policy.
Additional consideration is given to ethnodoxy, an idea proposed by University of
Western Michigan sociologist Vyachslav Karpov which explicates how the church can
exert such powerful influence in a country with very low statistical levels of religiosity.
The cultural impact of Orthodoxy on Russian consciousness pre-1917 was brought
forward by first the church and later the state as the Soviet Union broke apart to help
develop a new Russian identity rooted in tradition. This church-state collaboration
extended beyond simple ethnic nationalism and came to a core part of the policymaking
apparatus of the Russian government.
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Nationalism in contemporary Russia both has its roots in the distant past and has
emerged from the ashes of the Soviet Union. The Russian Federation emerged in 1991 as
a multiethnic state unified on lines other than the ideological basis of Marxism-Leninism
that typified the Soviet period. Seeking a new basis for unification and a return to
stability after the tumultuous 1990s, the Russian state eventually turned to an increasingly
close relationship with the Russian Orthodox Church. The Church had formed an
important part of Russian national mythology dating far into the past, and had more
recently cultivated a practice of government collaboration to survive through the
Communist era. With the Russian Orthodox Church, Presidents Yeltsin and Putin found
a willing partner in the development of a new Russian national identity rooted in
perceived longstanding traditions. The church and state have used this partnership both
to drive this national cohesion and to direct policy priorities both domestically and
abroad.
The lengthy history of the Russian Orthodox Church and its interactions with the
state necessitates a certain level of historical analysis before any serious discussion of
modern relations can be embarked upon. The thousand-year history of Orthodoxy in
Russia is a complex one, the close relationship between religion and state policy a
practice with deep roots. Until the Russian Revolution, the state carefully cultivated a
connection between Orthodoxy and Russian identity so strong that it has persisted in
some form through the dramatic changes of the past century. The focus of this paper is
on the present day cooption of Orthodoxy by political forces in the creation of Russian
national identity; with a brief coverage of the prior history of this relationship, the
modern situation will become far clearer.
1

Prince Vladimir of Kiev adopted a very specific form of Christianity in AD 988,
one which held to dual Byzantine ideas of government hierarchy and church-state
relations. In government, Orthodox theology held that the structure of Earthly
governance should mirror heaven—one authoritative figure on top of a wholly
centralized system. During the late medieval era this took the form of the consolidation
of power under the Muscovite princes who eventually took the title “tsar”—a
russification of Roman “Caesar.” Grand Prince of Muscovy Ivan IV (otherwise known as
Ivan the Terrible) was the monarch who first took on this title. This centralized apparatus
persisted into the Soviet period, pushing the state in a centralizing direction under strong
leaders such as Vladimir Lenin or Joseph Stalin. Church-state relations were a more
confusing aspect of this legacy; the Russian Orthodox Church holds to a theology known
as symphonia. Symphonia emerged as the contrasting belief to the Western doctrine of
the two swords, arguing that instead of existing separately, the spheres of church and
state should work together to create good governance. This viewpoint, arguably initiated
by the Emperor Constantine but clearly embedded in Byzantine state character by the
reign of Justinian in the early 6th century, holds that the political leadership and
ecclesiastical leadership are called to work together as instruments in an orchestra—
different in spheres of influence but equal in power.1 The policy was officially adopted
in Russia under Ivan IV with the promulgation of Стогдав (Stoglav; The Book of One
Hundred Chapters) in 1551.
While abandoned by the state with the fall of the Russian Empire in 1917,
symphonia remains the official position of the Russian Orthodox Church today. The
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2

Russian Orthodox Church supported the coalescence of supreme power under the
Muscovite princes during the struggle against the Mongol-Tatar yoke and continued to
provide theological underpinnings for their dominance into the 20th century. From 988
until that point, “mutual aid linked the two together irrevocably, both in institutions and
in the mind of the people, while the princes’ problem of maintaining political
independence from emperor and patriarch left the church perhaps less independent of the
state than at Byzantium.”2 Tsar Nicholas I made this relationship even more explicit in
1833 when he promulgated his “Triad of Official Nationality”: pravoslaviye,
samoderzhaviye, narodnost’ (Orthodoxy, Autocracy, Nationalism). This descriptor laid
out the foundations on which the Russian state was based in no uncertain terms—the
church sitting right atop alongside the government. This pattern of relations broke down
following the Soviet rise to power; while a centralized leadership model could persist
through the ideological shift, such a collaborative effort in the realm of governance
clearly could not and the state had little interest in propping up an antiquated,
superstitious body.3
The position of the church was weakened during the Soviet period, but its role in
Russian society also underwent a powerful evolution. The locus for a mildly pro-Church
reorientation can be found at the outbreak of World War II and the Orthodox response
therein; Dr. Philip Walters, editor of Religion, State, and Society, notes that in the
aftermath of Hitler’s invasion, “the first to appeal to the patriotic spirit of the Soviet
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For a generalized coverage of Russian history including the conversion of Prince Vladimir and later
relations between the Russian Orthodox Church and the state, see Nicholas Riasanovsky and Mark
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people and call on them to resist the fascist aggressor was Metropolitan Sergi.”4 More
commonly known as Patriarch Sergius of Moscow, Sergi was the effective leader of
Russian Orthodoxy from 1925-1944. Soviet estimates from the mid-1930s concluded
that around 57% of the population remained Orthodox believers at the time; the results of
a question on religious belief were suppressed from the 1937 Soviet census and the
question did not reappear in 1939. Regardless of specific numbers, it is evident that the
Church remained a potent force in a moral sense to influence the Russian population;
Stalin recognized this and in 1943 met with Sergius to form an alliance which would
typify relations for the next 50 years, the tacit agreement mentioned above. While
Walters notes that a campaign of deception to convince the world that the Russian
Orthodox Church was operating as an autonomous institution took place, he does take a
fairly optimistic view of Church autonomy from 1943-59 and after 1964. This view has
been seriously challenged by more recent scholarship and seems unlikely to hold up to a
historian’s scrutiny; a better descriptor of the period would perhaps be continuous lowlevel harassment and tight state control.5
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It can be said that the character of the Russian state through its various iterations
has maintained certain similarities. Each Russian state has been to varying degrees
autocratic, highly centralized, heavily militarized, and expansionistic in outlook. While
the latter two are less than germane to the topic of this study, the former are in many
ways a product of the historically pervasive influence of the Russian Orthodox Church on
society. An autocratic power structure was both needed to throw off Tatar domination
and in line with the stated church goal of mirroring the model of heaven on Earth.
Centralization was again critical to both of these goals. Even amidst an official policy of
atheism, this cultural impact of Orthodoxy could not be undermined over the course of
the seventy-year history of the Soviet Union. It can additionally be said to persist today.6
Religious affiliation declined markedly during the Soviet period, making it
difficult to explain the central role which Orthodoxy occupies in modern Russian national
consciousness. While early in the Soviet period when repression of the Church was at an
all-time high, “the loyalty of the Soviet public to the virtually nonexistent church
remained substantial,” this affiliation later dramatically declined.7 By the collapse of the
Soviet Union in 1991, only 31% of Russians identified as Orthodox Christians while 61%
professed no religious affiliation.8 Interestingly, at the same time that 31% professed an
Orthodox identity, only 11% of Russians described themselves as at least “somewhat
religious.” Here can be seen the first inklings of the suggestion that affiliation with
Orthodoxy is not tied so much to genuine religious belief as to its long-term impact on
the Russian cultural psyche.
6

Information on the historic development of the Russian state distilled from the lectures of James Warhola
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Ethnodoxy
Before progressing to discuss in detail the role of the church in the collapse of
communism and the emergence of a new Russian identity, the issue of belief must be
addressed. As noted above, by the mid-1930s around 57% of Soviet citizens identified as
religiously Orthodox.9 Shortly afterward, the question vanished from Soviet censuses
and data is thus unavailable. It seems clear from post-Soviet surveys, though, that
religious affiliation continued to decline throughout the Soviet period and that by the
Gorbachev years believers were a distinctive minority. The question remains, then, how
the Russian Orthodox Church was able to exert influence among a population that did not
believe in its dogma. University of Western Michigan sociologist Vyacheslav Karpov
coined the term ethnodoxy to explain this phenomenon in a 2012 paper which employed
modern Russia as a case study. He describes ethnodoxy as, “an ideology which rigidly
links a group’s ethnic identity to its dominant faith.”10 In short, the concept suggested
that in a nation state where popular identification has long been linked to a religious
identity, the secular bond can come to be conflated with a dominant religious tradition, as
in the case of Russian Orthodoxy. The people may not come to believe in the tenets of
the religion, but their group identification with it persists into a more secular era. A
modern example of this phenomenon could be the large number of Americans who do not
attend church services but continue to identify with Protestant Christianity. Karpov
discusses the emergence of so-called “ethnic religions,” faith groups to which one
belongs without believing. In short, “at the societal level, the power of beliefs conflating
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faith and ethnos profoundly manifests itself in highly secularized settings, where
individual-level piety is relatively low.”11
Ethnodoxy as a concept sought to explicate the unique situation in modern Russia
wherein religious belief among the population is exceptionally low, but regard for and
identification with the Russian Orthodox Church remains exceptionally high. Karpov
suggested that an identification with Orthodoxy had become a core tenet of Russian
ethnic nationalism; his conceptualization created seven core criteria for applying the term
and found all seven of these present in the Russian case. This connection meshed
closely with the highly unusual nature of Russian self-identification—there is not a single
Russian identity in the Russian language, and connotations are key. Some small
consideration of the Russian language terminology is here essential in understanding the
emerging role of Orthodoxy.
In the Russian language, two separate words are used to refer to the English
“Russian:” russki and rossiyski. Rossiyski refers to the political context, a citizen of the
Russian Federation or previously of the Soviet Union; the term is roughly analogous to
the former term sovetski. Russki, on the other hand, refers to Russian in the ethnic or
cultural context. It is this second “Russian” which has been wrapped up in Orthodoxy—
Russians grew to expect that if someone was ethnically Russian, then they would be at
least culturally Orthodox. A warmth toward the Church persisted even as religious
identification decreased. At the time of Karpov’s study, “85 percent of Russians agreed
or strongly agreed with the idea of inborn faithfulness…”12 Karpov’s study established
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this conflation which helps to explain the continuing relevance of the Russian Orthodox
Church. His work is novel and difficult to compare as it is such a step away from its
preceding scholarship; his conclusions seem well-researched and have not been
significantly challenged. Barring subsequent evidence to the contrary, Karpov’s
argument is the most likely and efficient explanation for continuing affinity for the
Russian Orthodox Church amidst late Soviet religious repression. With this idea
established, the remarkable events beginning in the late 1980s become far more
understandable.

Legacies of Perestroika in the Church
While the Soviet Union was deeply embroiled in the spirit of perestroika by 1988,
the Russian Orthodox Church held its fifth sobor–the Local Council of the Russian
Orthodox Church, a binding meeting of church hierarchs similar to the ecumenical
councils of the Catholic Church. New policies enacted by 1988 sobor along with the
loosening of government control over the church led to a growing involvement of the
Church in Russian nationalist politics. During the Gorbachev period, a split developed
between two major camps of Russian nationalists. One group, broadly the conservative
nationalists, opposed Gorbachev’s changes and sought to restore a more fundamental
Soviet system of rule, allying themselves with a fading group of reactionary neoStalinists. On the other hand, a group of liberal nationalists emerged in a loose alliance
with Western-style liberals—of this group the most prominent individual would be Boris
Yeltsin, later President of the Russian Federation. This group of liberal nationalists
sought to separate themselves from the negatives of the Soviet legacy and cultivate a
strong Russian sense of belonging, rather than strictly Soviet. They were broadly pro8

democratic, pro-free market, and resembled Western liberals in all but one major
respect—a substantial component of their unique Russian identity was wrapped up in
Orthodoxy. John Dunlop explained that “the liberal nationalists are distinguished from
Western-style liberals by their often fervent attachment to Russian Orthodoxy and to
Russian traditions, and by their especially pronounced abhorrence of Marxist-Leninist
ideology.”13 While Dunlop erred in predicting that the liberal nationalist attraction to
Orthodoxy as a component of Russian identity would lead to the formation of a strong
Christian Democratic political party, he made an important point about the changing
concerns of Russia’s leadership. Like Gorbachev before them, the leaders of the liberal
nationalist movement recognized the potent force which the Russian Orthodox Church
could bring to bear for their controversial cause; in order for liberal democracy to be
successful, a uniquely Russian identity separate from Soviet ideology needed to be
cultivated. Only the Russian Orthodox Church could offer the pre-Soviet continuity to
lend credence to this formation.
This is not to say, though, that the relationship between the liberal nationalists and
the church elite was a particularly strong one. To the contrary, “Many liberal Russian
nationalists are implacable opponents of the hierarchy of the Moscow Patriarchate, whom
they see as carriers of the bacillus of sergiyevshchina.”14 In other words, the nationalists
saw much of the higher echelons of the Orthodox Church as being little more than an
ecclesiastical nomenklatura, failing to truly represent a change from the Soviet regime.15
13

John B. Dunlop, “The Russian Orthodox Church and Nationalism After 1988,” in Religion in Communist
Lands (18:4, 1990), 300.
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Ibid., 301.
15
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USSR and the Orthodox Church were one and the same—essentially a declaration of loyalty to Soviet
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Liberal nationalists feared the level of influence which the KGB could still exert over the
Church and especially raised concern at the questionable election of Patriarch Alexy in
June 1990—typical conventions of mourning for the previous patriarch and democratic
election of his successor were not necessarily followed. Along with Alexy’s meteoric
rise in the church and his support from the KGB, liberal nationalists feared this meant
that the organization had been further dominated by the security services and thus began
to distance themselves.
On the other hand, the influence of the Orthodox Church on the conservative
coalition only increased throughout this period. As the neo-Stalinist cohort continued to
wane in influence through a series of poor tactical maneuvers, the conservative
nationalists with a strong affinity for Orthodoxy took on a larger role in the coalition—
eventually this group came to embrace Alexy’s Orthodox Church as the liberal
nationalists grew more vocal in their criticism of the leadership. Dunlop was far clearer
about this group than about the liberal nationalists, leaving no doubt that, “most leading
conservative Russian nationalists appear to be either Russian Orthodox believers or
persons sympathetic to Orthodoxy as an embodiment of the Russian spirit.”16 The only
core difference between many conservative nationalists and the Orthodox Church
hierarchy was a rejection of world ecumenism by the nationalist cohort. A strong
monarchist bent among conservative nationalists lined up particularly strongly with the
Church’s conception of symphonia with the sole exception of this dispute.

leadership. This philosophy was reviled as a betrayal by Orthodox dissidents and represents one of the
major factors in Russian Orthodox Churches attempting to break away from the Moscow Patriarchate.
16
Ibid., 303.
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While liberal and conservative nationalists had extremely different aims ranging
from a restoration of absolute monarchy to the development of a Western-style
democracy, they were united around the conflation of Russian nationalism with Russian
Orthodoxy. Across the board and even as both groups had serious problems with the
Church leadership, it was understood that Orthodoxy formed a core and inseparable part
of Russian cultural identity. Each group would seek to move Church leadership in its
direction, but neither considered jettisoning the Church from their carefully cultivated
ideologies of nationalism.

Evolving Symphonia
The relationship between the Russian Orthodox Church and political power which
grew out of the perestroika reforms of the 1980s can be understood as an attempt to
recreate symphonia in a modern political context. As two instruments in the same
orchestra, the Church and the state should not be discordant to each other—this principle
drove the Church’s public support of government initiatives even as they may not directly
follow the Church’s own preference. Gorbachev likewise sought the legitimating power
and influence of the Orthodox Church in order to overcome hardline communist
opposition to his reforms.17 A new coalition was formed between the pro-perestroika
Soviet leadership and the Orthodox Church hierarchy which granted the Church
substantial new privileges and the restoration of great amounts of confiscated property
including the historically significant Danilov Monastery and the Trinity Lavra of St.
17

For a firsthand discussion of this move toward Orthodoxy, see Mikhail Gorbachev, Perestroika: New
Thinking for Our Country and the World. (New York: Harper and Row, 1987). For a secondary
interpretation, consider Christopher Marsh, “Russian Orthodox Christians and Their Orientation toward
Church and State,” in Perspectives on Church-State Relations in Russia, ed. Daniel, Berger, and Marsh
(Waco: J.M. Dawson Institute of Church-State Studies, 2008), 85-88.
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Sergius, the so-called spiritual center of the Russian church.18 The Church was permitted
to establish an independent governing structure and even violate state laws without
repercussion in exchange for its support, as was seen most notably in the case of the
Arzamas charity collection.19
This relationship only continued to grow as Soviet power began to decline amidst
the emergence of regional nationalism. Unlike the other state republics, the Russian
Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR) was not wholly unified by a strong ethnic
identity; it had substantial minority populations and had been created through centuries of
imperial conquest. Nationalist forces coopted the common tradition of Orthodoxy as a
core value in the establishment of a definitive Russian identity. This drove an
increasingly close collaboration with the Orthodox Church hierarchy which has persisted
into the present day. The Orthodox Church was clearly the weaker partner in the churchstate relationship, but it was still able to exert dramatic influence on specific areas and
was given wide leeway to operate insofar as it did not conflict with state aims.
One major subcomponent of this evolution was the reassertion of ecclesiastical
independence on the part of autocephalous churches in the former Soviet republics.20
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For information on the détente between church and state leading up to the 1988 sobor see Helen Bell and
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Under the Soviet regime, the church structure had been consolidated around Moscow for
organizational purposes, but this flew in the face of Orthodox tradition and theology. As
Soviet power collapse, groups such as the Ukrainian Orthodox Church reasserted their
independence from Moscow, leaving a smaller but more ethnically cohesive Russian
Orthodox Church in the wake. This trend served to strengthen the corroboration between
Orthodoxy and Russian national identity which had already begun to establish itself
firmly in the Russian consciousness.

Yeltsin’s Outreach to the ROC
President Boris Yeltsin, as was above mentioned, enjoyed a mixed relationship
with the Orthodox Church. Events such as the election of Patriarch Alexy in 1990 had
served to dampen liberal nationalist enthusiasm for Orthodoxy as a component of Russian
nationalism. Yeltsin, feted across the West for his enlightened and liberal democratic
ideas, did not fit in the mold of the typical Orthodox-minded politician. He was a
Westernizer; strong proclivities towards Orthodoxy had always been the province of the
Slavophiles in Russia’s great directional debate.21 And yet, religion held some
excitement for the people in the aftermath of the Soviet experiment. “In 1990, many
Russians saw religion in the same rosy glow in which they saw everything non-Soviet,
from rock music to fast food to monarchism. If the Soviet Union had been against it, they

Orthodoxy, with the Patriarch of Constantinople recognized as a key figure in the wider church, but only as
“first among equals.”
21
Two intellectual movements emerged in the 1840s in Russia, those of the Westernizers and the
Slavophiles. Slavophiles favored the pursuit of Russia’s own unique development, highlighting its nonWestern attributes, while Westernizers felt that Russia should seek to emulate the West in culture, civil
society, and political structures. Generally speaking, Slavophiles have prevailed in Russian discourse.
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were for it—or thought it at least worth a try.”22 Russians were curious about a centuriesold aspect of their lives that had been kept under tight reins, ready to look on the
Orthodox Church with new eyes even if their president wasn’t overly enthusiastic.
The new Russian government still faced the obstacle of constructing a uniquely
Russian national identity, though. Through both the imperial and Soviet periods, Russia
had been a vast multiethnic state and the Russians just one component of that, albeit an
important one. A post-Soviet Russian government was faced with the task not only of
deconstructing the apparatus of Communism, but also fostering the creation of a cohesive
new identity for its citizenry. Ethnic Russians formed a far greater proportion of the new
Russian Federation than they ever had of previous Russian states, but were still not an
absolute majority and further their group identity had been de-emphasized rather than
reinforced during the Soviet period.
The crystallizing moment between President Yeltsin and the Russian Orthodox
Church came during the attempted coup of 1991. A faction of hardline Soviets led by
Vladimir Kryuchkov, the head of the KGB, arrested President Gorbachev of the USSR on
August 18, declaring a state emergency committee was taking control of the Soviet
government. While he avoided arrest like Gorbachev, Yeltsin found himself barricaded
into the House of the Soviets (the so-called Russian White House) surrounded by tanks
and without much outward support. When he was able to reactivate a radio broadcast,
Yeltsin chose to make a fateful call to what may have been his only ally with any degree
of influence in Moscow, the newly elected Patriarch Alexy:

22
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The tragic events that have occurred throughout the night made me turn to you, to
reach the nation through you…Our state has been violated and along with it the
newly emerging democracy, and freedom of choice for the electorate. There is
once again the shadow of disorder and chaos hanging over our country.
At this moment of tragedy for our Fatherland I turn to you, calling on your
authority among all religious confessions and believers. The influence of the
Church in our society is too great for the Church to stand aside during these
events. This duty is directly related to the Church’s mission, to which you have
dedicated your life: serving people, caring for their hearts and souls. The Church,
which has suffered through the times of totalitarianism, may once again
experience disorder and lawlessness.
All believers, the Russian nation, and all Russia await your word!23
Both a call to arms and a paean to Orthodoxy, this address puts in explicit terms several
key observations regarding the role of the Orthodox Church in Russian life. Yeltsin’s
opening statement, that he hopes to reach the nation through the Patriarch, was a
powerful recognition of the influence which the Orthodox Church could still hold over
the population of the atheist Soviet Union. The Patriarch remained just about the only
free person in Moscow who could publicly speak out against the coup with any degree of
influence.
Yeltsin suggested that the Church had a duty (emphasis his) to oppose the coup
attempt, not simply that it was in the Church’s interest to oppose a return to earlier Soviet
policies. This assertion harkens back to the earlier relations between the Orthodox
Church and the state in Russia. The concordat between church and state, rooted in the
old ideas of symphonia, involved the church supporting the legitimate state with all the
weight it could bring to bear. Even as the Soviet state was atheistic and antagonistic
towards the Orthodox Church, Yeltsin still expected the Patriarchate to stand by the
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legitimacy of government. The coup attempt was framed not as an assault on the
government, but on the Russian people themselves who the Church was bound to protect.
Despite any misgivings that the Patriarch may have had about Gorbachev’s regime
(although these would certainly have been less than previous Patriarchs may have felt
towards previous First Secretaries), it still represented the embodiment of the people
more so than Kryuchkov’s conspirators.
The final exhortation of Yeltsin’s address would seem to lend some credence to
Karpov’s theory of ethnodoxy. Rather than just declaring that Orthodox believers
awaited the Patriarch’s response, Yeltsin boldly declares that, “the Russian nation, and all
Russia await your word!”24 A group far larger than the faithful sought the guidance of
the Patriarch in such a trying time—Yeltsin carefully places the entire Russian nation
under the shepherding of the Patriarch of Moscow. This assumption ties into the
traditional conflation of Russian nationalism and Russian Orthodoxy; the classic
formulaic of “pravoslaviye, samoderzhaviye, narodnost’” (Orthodoxy, Autocracy,
Nationalism) articulated by Nicholas I in 1833 still held sway after seventy years of
Communist rule.
One aspect of this address worth noting is the distinction between the Russian
nation and all Russia that Yeltsin drew. Part of Yeltsin’s goal as President of the Russian
Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR) was to reassert Russian nationalism and
identification with Russia as an entity separate from the wider conglomeration of the
Soviet Union. Even in his attempts to counter a Soviet coup, Yeltsin would not speak
about the Soviet people. It is likely that Yeltsin’s reference to the Russian nation in this
24
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context is referential to the historical community of ethnic Russians with their shared
values. Ethnic Russians who had a deep background in Orthodoxy may not believe in
God on an individual level, but overall held a great deal of respect for the institutional
church that represented the only body of continuity throughout their history; on every
measured survey indicator, a large majority of the population comes out in favor of
Orthodoxy, including a surprising, “85% of Russians [that] agreed or strongly agreed
with the idea of inborn faithfulness (i.e., that any Russian, even if s/he is not baptized and
does not go to church, is Orthodox in his/her heart).”25 All Russia, on the other hand,
probably referred to the extent of Russia’s domains—an area roughly contiguous to the
Soviet Union, but again Yeltsin would not choose to phrase it this way. This last
phraseology would be meant to appeal to those non-ethnic Russians who might still
identify with Orthodoxy, such as the nascent Ukrainian Orthodox or Georgian Orthodox
communities in the other Soviet Socialist Republics (SSRs); while Yeltsin was only
President of the RSFSR, the importance of Russia within the Soviet Union and Yeltsin’s
presence in Moscow meant he was better equipped than most to speak to the entire Soviet
Union.

The Patriarch Involves Himself in Politics
This was a pivotal moment for the Russian Orthodox Church; Patriarch Alexy had
the chance to re-engage with the Russian population at a time of trial and make a
significant choice that would impact the future of the state. At first he moved rather
subtly. Shortly after Yeltsin’s address, Alexy was presiding over a liturgy at the
Cathedral of the Assumption inside the Kremlin. John and Carol Garrard recount that,
25
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“instead of remembering the ‘authorities’ and ‘the army’ as was customary, he prayed
‘for our country protected by God and its people.’”26 Long a backer of the Russian (and
Soviet) armed forces and state authority, here the Patriarch took a seemingly semantic but
significant stance against the institutional forces lining up to overcome the people’s will.
In particular, the Patriarch’s omission of the Army from his blessing on a significant feast
day liturgy would have given several in the military pause. This formulation was quickly
followed by a fax sent around the world, in which the Patriarch demanded that the people
should hear from Gorbachev himself and declared that,
We call upon all parts of the Russian Orthodox Church, the whole of our people,
and particularly our army at this critical moment for our nation to show support
and not to permit the shedding of fraternal blood. We raise the heartfelt prayer to
our Lord and summon all true believers in our Church to join this prayer begging
Him to dispense peace to the peoples of our land so that they can in future build
their homeland in accordance with freedom of choice and the accepted norms of
morality and law.
Aleksy II, Patriarch of Moscow and All Russia, 20th August 1991 Moscow27
This more explicit reference to the army and its duty amidst this crisis demonstrates the
ultimate concern that the Patriarch had was to prevent an outbreak of violent bloodshed.
Prior to Alexy’s fax, word had gone out that 10 tanks and associated soldiers had gone
over to Yeltsin’s side and were defending the White House. The first concern that he
sought to address, thus, was the prevention of immediate Russian bloodshed. This tactic
seems to have been effective; when the junta tried to order the army to move against
Yeltsin, the orders were refused—Soviet officers would not fight their own compatriots.
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More broadly, Patriarch Alexy spoke to “the whole of our people,” in this
announcement. Like Yeltsin’s reference to the Russian nation in his own earlier address,
the Patriarch is calling out to a group that is perceived as unified by the common bonds of
Orthodoxy: the people of Russia. While the Patriarch does speak to “all true believers in
our Church” a couple of sentences later, his first specific reference to an audience
remains the whole Russian people. Yeltsin and Patriarch Alexy here share the same goal
of fostering a unity among the Russian people that was thoroughly de-emphasized during
the Soviet period. By choosing to stand with Yeltsin’s Russia, Patriarch Alexy is aiming
to rebuild the close linkage between the state and the church which typified pre-Soviet
Russia. At the same time, he called for President Gorbachev to address the nation on the
state of affairs—Alexy was not willing to explicitly stand for Yeltsin himself, but instead
pushed for the legitimate voice of Soviet governance to speak.
A minor but significant aspect of this announcement is the title by which the
Patriarch chooses to refer to himself. The pronouncement is signed, “Aleksy II, Patriarch
of Moscow and All Russia,” the traditional title of the Patriarch of Moscow. This was
not, however, the title he was accorded or recognized with by the Soviet government. As
part of the Church’s deal with Stalin around the onset of World War II, the title of the
Patriarch had been revised to “Patriarch of Moscow and All Rus’” because Russia was no
longer a significant legal entity. Rus’ had a nice historic sound to it and allowed the
Patriarch’s jurisdiction to extend throughout the various SSRs, while also de-emphasizing
the exclusionary Russian nature of Moscow’s Patriarchate in line with ostensible Soviet
goals of erasing ethnic divisions within the USSR. Just as Yeltsin chose to refer to the
Russian nation and all Russia, rather than the Soviet Union, when he exhorted Alexy to
19

take a stand on the coup, Alexy chose to fall back on his own historic title which referred
specifically to the state of Russia. Both the President of the yet-to-exist sovereign state
and the Patriarch of its historic church used this opportunity to re-assert the identification
of the people with their “Russian-ness.” The two parties both recognized and sought to
take advantage of the position of the Church to build up a strong new Russian identity in
opposition to the revanchist Soviet forces under Khryuchkov.
This particular address was also a very savvy political piece. On its most basic
level, this document challenged the legitimacy of the coup which had taken place. Before
getting to any of his exhortations to the people or the armed forces, the Patriarch zoned in
on the controversy surrounding Gorbachev’s retirement. His address began with the
observation that, “this situation is troubling the consciences of millions of our fellow
citizens, who are concerned about the legality of the newly formed State Emergency
Committee which has declared that it has taken supreme power in the USSR.”28 This was
followed quickly by a demand to hear from President Gorbachev himself his own views
on these circumstances. The address thus served as a call to restore law and stability in
society like Yeltsin’s initial address, but it also reached out to Gorbachev rather than
Yeltsin himself. Before ever appealing to the people, the Patriarch specifically reached
out to the legitimate governing institutions. Along with this, it is worth noting that he
directed his appeal to the government and not the party institutions; “we hope that the
Supreme Soviet of the USSR will give careful consideration to what has taken place and
will take decisive measures to bring about the stabilization of the situation in the
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country.”29 The Patriarch specifically did not ask the top party apparatus for action, but
the top governing body. Perhaps a bit like Alexy’s title, this telling tidbit suggests that
any allegiance that the Church may have developed to the Soviet leadership was to the
governing institutions themselves, not the Communist Party which occupied them. A
traditionally conservative force in society, the Church would back the legitimate
governing organs even when it did not like the policy of those holding office.
The August 20 fax was not the full extent of the Church’s weight mustered
against the coup attempt. Less than 24 hours after this announcement had been released,
fighting broke out and two young men were shot while another was trampled under a
tank outside the Russian White House. Angry crowds swarmed and military vehicles
were set on fire in protest. The Patriarch learned of these events almost immediately and
took an unheard-of step for Church officials in the Soviet period: he got on the radio and
made a live public address. This powerful statement appealed to the people to let their
better sides shine through, an approach that was, “more personal and more magisterial,”
in John and Carol Garrard’s words.30 The Patriarch attempted to unify the long
institutional power that his office held with a connection to the Russian past and previous
struggles. To this end, Alexy opened his address with “Brothers and Sisters,” the same
formulation that Joseph Stalin used in his wartime radio addresses after the Germans
invaded the Soviet Union. Stalin had called on his brothers and sisters to stand up and
repel invaders; Alexy now called on these same brothers and sisters to prevent the
outbreak of civil war.31 This address represented the first time that the Patriarch of
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Moscow had spoken unfiltered to the whole of his people at least since the Russian
Revolution, if not the first time in history:
Brothers and Sisters! The delicate civil peace of our society has been rent asunder.
According to the latest information, open armed conflict and loss of life have
begun. In these circumstances, my duty as Patriarch is to warn everybody for
whom the word of the church is dear and carries weight: Every person who raises
arms against his neighbor, against unarmed civilians, will be taking upon his soul
a very profound sin which will separate him from the Church and from God. It is
appropriate to shed more tears and say more prayers for such people than for their
victims.
May God protect you from the terrible sin of fratricide. I solemnly warn all my
fellow-citizens:
The Church does not condone and cannot condone unlawful and violent acts and
the shedding of blood.
I ask all of you, my dear ones, to do everything possible to prevent the flame of
civil war from bursting forth.
Cease at once!
I ask soldiers and their officers to remember that no one can set a prince on
human life and pay it.
I ask the Most Holy Mother of God, the Protector of our city, at this time of the
Feast of the Transfiguration, not to withdraw Her protection from us, but to
preserve all of us.
O Mother of God, help us to reconcile ourselves to one another, to the truth, and
to God!
Aleksy II, Patriarch of Moscow and All Russia32
While couched in liturgical language, Alexy’s address was at heart an appeal to morals
and to shared Russian identity. References to the Mother of God as a protector of
Moscow date back almost as far as the city of Moscow itself, and go even further to when
the city of Constantinople asserted the same protection. One of the most famous images
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from surviving sources on the Fall of Constantinople in 1453 is the Patriarch in full
regalia processing along the city’s bombarded walls with an icon of the Virgin Mary
believed to have been painted by St. Luke himself. The same practice had been
employed in previous Russian conflicts; both Dmitry Donskoi and Alexander Nevsky’s
legends are often linked to the intervention of the Theotokos.33 It is no surprise, then,
that, “these references to Mary as the “Protector of our city” tapped the deepest memory
of the Russian people.”34
The reference to Theotokos quickly had its desired effect. The closing appeal of
Alexy’s speech was not really unique, it was a truncated form of, “the famous troparion
written to the Kazan Icon of the Theotokos credited with saving the city in the early
seventeenth century.”35 This would have been one of the most familiar prayers to
Russian Orthodox believers and a classic point to turn in troubled times. The very same
words had been employed during the Polish invasion of 1612, then again in the Swedish
invasion of 1709, and a third time at Napoleon’s 1812 invasion. Reaction among the
gathered crowd at the House of the Soviets was swift; “upon hearing Mater Bozhia, the
Russian Orthodox believers in the crowd began crossing themselves and bowing, thus
completing with their bodies a direct and dynamic relationship between the patriarch and
his flock.”36 The people confirmed that Alexy’s words still held sway, a fact that was not
at all clear prior to the August coup.
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On a personal level to Alexy, this is the same imagery that Patriarch Alexy I
employed during the German invasion in 1941; the closest equivalent to Alexy’s August
21 radio address in Soviet history was when Stalin allowed Metropolitan Alexy of
Leningrad and Novgorod to make a speech from Moscow’s Bogoyavlensky (Epiphany)
Cathedral. Alexy had chosen his regnal name in no small part because of Alexy I’s
actions in 1941, a moment when Russia’s fate stood in the balance and the church stood
up to rally the people. Even Stalin recognized the profound capacity of the Orthodox
Church to inspire Russians, so, “on August 10, 1941, the Red Army was retreating on all
fronts, and German Panzers were racing towards Moscow. Desperate to rally the people,
Stalin turned not to the party but to the ROC.”37 While not broadcast across the nation by
radio and while not yet the Patriarch, Alexy I’s inspirational speech dove deep into the
trove of Russian historical memory, citing Kutuzov, Nevsky, Donskoi and St. Sergius of
Radonezh among others. It also involved appeals to Theotokos, just as Alexy II would
employ fifty years later. There is little doubt that the Patriarch recognized the striking
similarities between August 1941 and August 1991 as he chose to make this address: it
was in times of severest crisis that the Church could break through Soviet barriers and
make a public stand with the people.
Patriarch Alexy assumed great personal risk in making this speech. Beyond the
question of ramifications for the Church breaking rules that had been laid out regarding
its conduct, he was making a very public appeal to the Theotokos for relief. Within the
Russian Orthodox Church, whether one’s prayer is answered or not is treated as a
reflection on whether a person is sufficiently faithful. Were bloodshed to proceed
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further, the Patriarch would have undermined his own faithfulness in the eyes of the
people, of the Church, and of the government. Had the coup succeeded, it is almost
certain that Alexy would have been removed from power and met an ignominious end.
Even were the coup to be defeated, he may still have struggled if it came at the cost of the
serious internecine bloodshed that he fervently prayed against. This ultimately did not
come to pass and indeed, the Patriarch’s reputation among Russians was only enhanced
by his timely intervention here, but that he was willing to assume this risk to make such a
statement is telling.

The Public Reaction and Re-Emergence of Religiosity
The impact of this speech was immediate, and for good reason. Garrard and
Garrard point out that the KGB’s favorite time to initiate action was 2 A.M. due to a
natural lethargy in the body’s circadian rhythm. Patriarch Alexy was aware of this
because a similar situation had unfolded in Lithuania around 6 months prior, in which the
KGB sent troops in at 2 A.M. over the Patriarch’s objection. This time, there was no 2
A.M. assault; after hearing the Patriarch’s address, members of the army outside the
House of the Soviets became unwilling to move in, especially not through the crowd of
people that was forming in support of Yeltsin. In a stunning public display of religiosity,
priests went up to the soldiers around the tanks and offered them bibles. Noted Russia
scholar and former Librarian of Congress James Billington recalled this scene vividly,
considering, “particularly remarkable…the distribution of 2,000 New Testaments to the
young would-be attackers and another 2,000 to the defenders of the White House by the
found of the Russian Bible Society, Father Alexander Borisov. Such actions blurred the
distinction between the opposing groups and suggested that there might be something
25

deeper to which both sides might rally.”38 Religion was a unifying force among Russian
people, the distribution of bibles symbolic of a profound connection that no government
orders could overcome.
The crowd around the White House quickly grew after Alexy’s moonlight appeal
for calm; primarily young and male before the Patriarch’s involvement, a much wider
subsection of the population quickly filtered onto the Krasnopresnenskaya embankment.
Billington was in a meeting with elderly female librarians when the speech began, and
remembered that, “spontaneously and without discussion, they all left to join the young
men on the barricades and other elderly women who had been rebuking soldiers in the
tanks.”39 Long discounted by both the Soviet government and Western observers as an
irrelevant, outdated group, these women who had attended church for their entire lives
despite harassment and oppression created even greater tension on the military members
in the square. They were no longer being asked to oppose simple political dissidents—
other young men and politicians—but their mothers and grandmothers, and in Russia one
does not trifle with one’s babushka. Yeltsin had galvanized the nascent political
opposition around himself, but the Patriarch was able to galvanize society as a whole.
A far larger crowd developed away from the White House, however, and made
their way to Lubyanka Square, the headquarters of the KGB. Here, the famous statue of
Felix Dzerzhinsky, the father of the Soviet Union’s secret police, was pulled down live
on CNN around the world. Garrard and Garrard report, however, that after the news
broadcast cut away, believers who had heard Patriarch Alexy’s prayer had erected an
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Orthodox cross in its place and painted the phrase, “sim pobedishi,” on its plinth.40 This
phrase is no doubt more familiar to the Western reader in Latin than in Old Church
Slavonic, in hoc signo vinces. Even as the security services removed the cross, the
Emperor Constantine’s vision remained on Dzerzhinsky’s former mount. There is some
poetic simile here; Constantine was the emperor who finally triumphed over paganism,
brought his people to Christianity, and founded the city of Constantinople which would
become the epicenter of Orthodoxy. Just as Constantine conquered the forces of
godlessness at the Milvian Bridge in A.D. 312, Russian Orthodox believers were
overthrowing the forces of institutionalized atheism and repression in 1991.

The Creation of Church Power in the Late Soviet Period
The massive and unexpected popular reaction to the Patriarch’s call to arms
reveals that in 1991, the Church held far more power in Russia than most analysts
realized. Even with comprehensive access to media outlets and government propaganda
officials, neither Yeltsin nor Kryuchkov could generate the level of support that Alexy
managed with one short radio broadcast. Since the Church spotted a thaw in the
government stance towards religion in the early 1980s, its elite had worked tirelessly to
build a quiet body of support and reassert influence where possible. This was abetted by
the Soviet desire to utilize the Church as a propaganda tool for Western audiences; the
body was allowed to develop sufficient autonomy that it was able to build up a base of
influence that such a shrewd operator as Patriarch Alexy was easily able to employ when
the opportunity presented itself.
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The response to the 1991 coup attempt is thus best understood as the first
manifestation of a carefully generated, reinvigorated Church presence in the twilight of
the Soviet Union. The Patriarchate had played upon its historic role in society and
connections to redevelop itself, building important relationships that would come through
when conflict erupted. As suggested earlier in this paper, one of the most significant
relationships that was rebuilt was that between the Orthodox Church and the Red Army.
Like in many other societies throughout history, the members of the Soviet armed forces
had the firm support of their church and a long-standing relationship. This has
manifested more recently in such odd events as the blessing of tanks by Orthodox priests
before they departed for Georgia in the 2008 South Ossetian conflict. Some form of
relationship between the Red Army and the Orthodox Church had first been firmly
developed during World War II under Patriarch Alexy I. This relationship had only been
built upon in the 1980s, so that when Alexy II chose to interject himself in politics, he,
“had been cultivating wingless allies with boots on the ground: the generals of the Red
Army.”41
The tactic paid off quickly. Alexander Rutskoy, the Vice President of the RSFSR
and a major Afghanistan war hero, spoke out backing the Patriarch after his fax had been
sent; this man carried a great deal of weight with the military crowd, his backing would
have been consequential in the eyes of many Red Army officers. Even before Alexy had
publicly spoken out against the coup attempt, the KGB’s Alpha Unit had refused to carry
out an order to storm the White House. Garrard and Garrard link this refusal to a
situation in Vilnius around six months prior, one in which there were many casualties and

41

Ibid., 26.

28

the Patriarch excoriated the Red Army and the government for such inappropriate action.
At the time, Alexy spoke directly to the soldiers who carried out the raid about sin and a
parable of John the Baptist. This apparently so affected the members of the Alpha Unit,
supposedly the KGB’s most ruthless men, to such an extent that they were willing to
refuse orders from the Communist Party. The result of the coup, then, was that, “the
alliance between the patriarchate and the military that had existed in the catacombs was
just beginning to surface into public view.”42 Having built up close connections with the
military elite, Patriarch Alexy was able to rely on their support to prevent further
bloodshed as the situation deteriorated.
Church power had been carefully cultivated below the surface during the 1980s
through the fostering of new relationships with society’s power brokers and an effective
model of operation that did not outwardly challenge the Soviet system. This left the
church in a strong position to exert influence when the system started to crack under its
own pressures. Writing shortly after this time period, Billington suggests that,
Russians today are living through what they call a ‘time of troubles,’ when one
form of legitimacy has been rejected, but no new form has yet been fully
accepted. In such a time, Russian Christianity brings with it the special authority
of having survived its targeted extinction under the Soviet system—and having
provided a previously flagging faith with what Russians call the “new martyrs,”
perhaps the greatest number of Christians persecuted or killed for their faith in
modern times.43
By the late 1980s, the Soviet experiment had in many ways lost its legitimacy. A
moribund economy, political repression at home, and a series of foreign policy blunders
abroad had eviscerated trust in government. At the same time, there was no credible
opposition with a claim to real legitimacy; this is essentially what Yeltsin, Rutskoy, and
42
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their compatriots were attempting to create out of the events of August 1991. As
Billington ably recognized, this left the church as the only body with the organizational
stability, respect, and legitimacy necessary to command the hearts and minds of the
people. There was no continuity to pre-revolutionary Russia outside of the Orthodox
Church by this time period; no other organization had survived in anything approaching
its original form.44 Further, the so-called martyrdom of believers at the hands of a nowdistrusted Soviet government added to the prestige of the church in popular eyes.
Through political savvy and a keen understanding of history, Patriarch Alexy led his
church to a real position of power in society able to seriously influence the outcome of
events as the Soviet Union fell apart.

Religious Freedom and the New Russian State
This did not mean, however, that Orthodoxy would rise to an immediate position
of power in the emerging Russian Federation. The level of optimism that accompanied
the fall of Communism in Western circles cannot be overstated. Observers presumed that
the new Russia would adopt European democratic norms and integrate into the “common
European home” which Gorbachev had made a centerpiece of his détente initiatives—not
revert back to the pre-1917 status quo of superficial symphonia. President Yeltsin was
feted the world over and talked the talk on the development of a strong democratic
society in Russia, including in the realm of religious freedom. Less outwardly concerned
with the Orthodox Church which had helped secure his success in the 1991 struggle for
power, Yeltsin became a staunch defender of religious freedom and pluralism against a
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backdrop of increasing calls to restrict minority religious groups. For several years, he
resisted efforts by the legislature and the Orthodox Church to adopt more explicitly proOrthodox government policies.
The influx of new religious missionary movements in the post-Soviet space was
swift and unrelenting. Gorbachev’s 1990 law on religious freedom had opened the door
for religious activism irrespective of one’s citizenship and independent of government
oversight, so foreign missionaries flooded into the country seeking converts. Among the
most numerous groups arriving in Russia at this time were Western Protestants. Of the
more mainstream denominations, Lutherans and Baptists attempted to gain a foothold in
Russia amidst the religious revival of the first years after communism’s collapse. Other
groups such as Mormons, Jehovah’s Witnesses, and the Salvation Army also made
appearances in cities and small towns across Russia. This was not, however, without
controversy. The Orthodox Church viewed such action as an affront; Russian Orthodoxy
had been an active participant in international ecumenical movements throughout the
Soviet period and knew that other denominations recognized its ancient form of
Christianity.45 The ingress of religious groups from other non-Russian denominations
was interpreted as a slap in the face, their target converts an already-Christian group of
people who fell within the Moscow Patriarchate’s natural influence. It should come as no
surprise, then, that efforts to restrict the liberal 1990 legislation would rapidly emerge.46
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The first major attempt to curtail religious liberty and grant additional privileges
to the Russian Orthodox Church came in August 1993, only about a month before the
constitutional crisis that would lead to the reconstitution of the legislative bodies and
Yeltsin’s consolidation of power. The Supreme Soviet attempted to amend Russia’s
landmark 1990 law “On Freedom of Worship,” an exceptionally liberal document
protecting freedom of conscience and practice of religion. These amendments would
have strictly curtailed religious liberty for the new foreign-based faith groups that had
entered Russia since the loosening of Soviet restrictions. Yeltsin’s official response
condemned the effort, stating that the proposed changes would contradict, “equal rights
of individuals to enjoy freedom of conscience and religion in the territory of Russia,
regardless of their possession of Russian citizenship.”47 The President thus emerged as a
defender of both the Constitution and newfound rights in Russia, a position which placed
him at least partially against an Orthodox Church body which was interested in regaining
its historic privileges from the Russian state.
The Orthodox Church was concerned by the fact that new Christian groups such
as Jehovah’s Witnesses, Mormons, and Lutherans were coming into Russia in increasing
numbers and attempting to convert people that the church saw as part of its own body
faithful. Proposed changes were thus rooted in a desire to protect the Orthodox from
being overcome by better-resourced foreign pressure. After Yeltsin came out of the 1993
power struggle with his position consolidated, it seemed that this aim was doomed for
defeat, but instead the rejection of the law was followed by, “four years of intense
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pressure brought by the Orthodox Church and by nationalist groups protesting the
activities of outside missionary organizations and newly emergent indigenous religious
groups.”48 The bulk of this skepticism was directed at Protestant movements with little
history in Russia, but it is worth noting that the Roman Catholic Church also faced
Orthodox opposition to its attempts to re-enter the Russian sphere. Even this
organization which itself had a lengthy history in parts of the Russian Empire was
targeted to the extent that Pope John Paul II was prevented from ever attaining a Russian
visa and visiting the country after decades of attempts.
Fear of losing their influence in society if multi-confessionalism became the norm
in Russia kept the church invested in the question of amendment to the landmark 1990
law. After the floodgates of missionary activity had opened in 1991, an Orthodox priest
decried the situation, lamenting that, “Moscow isn’t a Babylon for secondary cults, for
Protestant congregations who resemble wild wolves rushing in here or Catholics like
thieves using their billions to try to occupy new territory.”49 In the church’s view, Russia
had its own longstanding faith tradition which had deserved preeminence in the new postSoviet space. Patriarch Alexy publicly expressed his conviction that, “unless the
government affirmed Russia’s traditional faiths against the aggressive actions of other
religious groups and sects…the renewal of Russia’s own spiritual traditions stood little
chance.”50 This position did manage to attract a fair degree of support amongst both
legislators and the wider population. Derek H. Davis suggests that this is because the
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1990 law, “was perhaps an idealized vision of what Russia might be in theory, but
nevertheless an overestimate of what Russia was prepared to be in practice.”51 As the
novelty of religious freedom wore off and actively proselytizing groups such as
Jehovah’s Witnesses grew to be the face of foreign religious movements, the popularity
of measures restricting their freedom of movement seemed to rise.
Even as he developed a closer relationship with the Orthodox Church in other
areas around the 1996 election, President Yeltsin remained firm on his opposition to
watering down the idealistic 1990 religious freedom law. When the first draft of the
proposed 1997 law ultimately reached his desk on July 23, he responded to the President
of the State Duma and President of the Federation Council that the law, “contradicts the
basic foundation of the constitutional structure of the Russian Federation, and generally
recognized principles and norms of international law.”52 This opposition was taken
further in his scheduled national radio address two days later. Yeltsin appealed to the
Russian people in defense of his stand, recognizing that, “Russia needs such a law
badly…to defend our people’s moral and spiritual health, to erect reliable barriers in the
way of radical sects that have already dealt enough harm, crippling the spiritual health of
many of our citizens, young people, first and foremost,” but also reasserting that, “a
democratic state cannot infringe on minorities’ interests (no matter what seemingly noble
interests might dictate such a move).”53 The incorporation of both a very real concern for
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the spiritual health of the people in Russia (and an implicit linkage of that health with
Orthodoxy) and a concern for democratic norms and basic rights highlights the longrunning dichotomy in Russian politics between considering themselves European and
considering themselves unique.
The struggle over the place of religious freedom in the new Russia was simply
one more reckoning of the age-old Slavophile versus Westernizer debate; the Orthodox
Church had never gotten along well with Westernizers and the Slavophile position
usually tended to win in the end. At the same time, these categories are
oversimplifications of the deep mixed loyalties inherent in Russian-ness. Yeltsin has
always been considered a Westernizer, but his actions here reveal an acute awareness of
and respect for the historical position of Orthodoxy in Russian society, the fundamental
non-European-ness that Russia has never been able to break away from. Patriarch Alexy,
on the other hand, represented the classic Slavophile, fearing that outside influence would
dilute the unique traditions of Russian faith, but still favoring a policy of ecumenism in
the church’s relations with the wider Christian community. In short, Alexy hoped to
maintain positive relations with world Christianity and win Russian Orthodoxy a seat at
the table in any future discussions, but this did not extend to allowing world Christianity
into Russia. In the end, Yeltsin was himself in the minority on this issue and ultimately
caved, signing a law that he had vetoed three times prior in the past four years without
any real changes having been made. This is not on its face surprising. Geraldine Fagan
of Forum 18, a religious freedom NGO, suggests that, “Russian national identity is
classically regarded as inseparable from mainline Orthodox Christianity…to both its

35

supporters and sceptics, religious freedom is therefore alien to Russian culture.”54
Yeltsin was fighting to defend a value that many would argue his countrymen simply do
not share. While this author would consider such a claim an overstatement, it is certainly
not an unusual point of view.
Regional bodies had not universally accepted the 1990 law, providing a template
for the opposition to Yeltsin which emerged between 1993 and 1997. Certain groups,
especially Hare Krishnas, Mormons, and Jehovah’s Witnesses attracted much attention
outside of Moscow, where, “early on regional courts began trespassing over the law by
restricting religious liberty to those groups they found distasteful…local and regional
courts had few qualms about violating these legally-guaranteed liberties when they were
seen as causing harm to Russia’s cultural environment.”55 Specifically targeted groups
often found their freedom to operate severely restricted beyond the terms of what the
1990 law would permit, but often did not get sufficient relief from legal avenues. This
regional action provided an important reference point for advocates in favor of harsher
national restrictions on religious freedom and was an example that could be cited to
demonstrate how such policies could work in practice. As support for more restrictive
measures grew at a national level, “the new legislation took its cue from the regional
religious laws by introducing discrimination between associations according to their
degree of establishment within Russia.”56 This precedent guided the creation of the 1997
legislation that President Yeltsin would ultimately commit to sign.
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Law on Freedom of Conscience and Religious Associations
The law that was ultimately passed in 1997 contained several articles that
demarcated three types by which a religious body could be categorized: religious
organizations, religious associations, and religious groups. Religious groups are the
simplest of the three categories, referring to an informal meeting without legal status such
as a bible study among friends. The two other categories, however, are the instrument by
which the state aimed to curtail the privileges of new foreign-based religious
organizations while recognizing pride of place and privilege for the Russian Orthodox
Church. This law continued to pay lip service to ideals of religious freedom; “the 1997
law again declares that Russia is a secular state, but it gives a privileged place to
Orthodoxy as coterminous with the state from its very beginnings.”57 In this manner the
state could claim that it was endeavoring to protect the rights that had come to be
expected after 1991, but also clamp down on those foreign organizations which both the
Russian Orthodox Church and the state deemed deleterious to stability.
It is worth noting that this law only targeted these foreign religious groups, not the
other longstanding minority faith groups in Russia. The aim was not to restrict religious
freedom of the people, per se, but to restrict the freedom of action of foreign groups; “this
was tolerance Russian-style: the ‘traditional’ faiths of Judaism, Islam, and Buddhism
were to be allowed to ‘own property, to have radio and television stations, and to
disseminate religious literature.’ They would be exempt from taxes and able to conduct
services…”58 These groups had a history in Russia dating back centuries, not so far as
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the Russian Orthodox Church but long enough that they could be safely considered
established. Further, they were accustomed to the parameters of working within the
Russian state. Groups which received the category of “religious association” would not
enjoy such privileges, although they had the opportunity over time to progress into
greater rights. Islam, Judaism, and Buddhism did not seem to represent the same threat to
Orthodoxy’s cultural dominance that Western Christian sects seemed to in the early
1990s.
The clear targeting of non-Orthodox Christian groups with this legislation
becomes even more evident when one approaches the manner in which Orthodoxy itself
is referenced within the statute. Geraldine Fagan observes that, “while it did not have
legal force, the law’s preamble set the relevant tone. It recognized Orthodox
Christianity’s ‘special role’ in Russia’s history, spirituality and culture…”59 This
interpretation was heavily supported by the Orthodox Church, which had developed an
increasingly negative view of its Western brethren beyond their longstanding theological
differences. Orthodoxy was not made a state religion in any official context, but the law,
“codified the idea that being Christian and being Orthodox are one and the same thing.”60
Special privileges were carved out for the Russian Orthodox Church, including the
distinction of being the only religious organization to be granted government financing
for, “the restoration, maintenance, and protection of buildings and objects which are
monuments of history and culture.”61 Unique material benefits such as these were
considered by many observers as tantamount to state establishment, although the law
59

Fagan, 66-67.
Garrard and Garrard, 173.
61
John Witte, “Introduction,” in Proselytism and Orthodoxy in Russia: The New War for Souls, ed. John
Witte and Michael Bordeaux (Maryknoll: Orbis Books, 1999), 14.
60

38

took great pains to not explicitly do so. The Russian perspective was different, one
rooted in the thousand-year comingled history of the Orthodox faith and the Russian
state. From this perspective, “the law explicitly identified Orthodox Christianity with
Russia’s national memory and heritage, which had to be recovered and strengthened, and
the church as an institution stood at the center of these efforts.”62 As an effort began to
reconstruct a Russian identity separate from the Soviet experience, the Orthodox Church
was an important partner and a powerful legitimating force; the continued surging
presence of non-Orthodox Christian movements would only dilute its effectiveness at this
task.
The 1997 religious freedom law was at the same time backward and forward
looking. The state was aligning itself with Orthodoxy to look back on an era of greater
stability and cooperation; Daniel and Marsh argue that, “in its conception, the 1997 law
reverted to a ‘traditional’ relationship between the Orthodox Church and the Russian
state, a symphonic relationship, in which the church and state worked together
harmoniously to manage worldly affairs and prepare inhabitants for entrance into the
world to come.”63 These terms should sound familiar, as symphonia was the relationship
which the Orthodox Church had idealized throughout this period. While the situation
was not so simple (Russian history has always been replete with examples of the state
bucking the church and this certainly has not changed since 1991), this is the framework
in which the 1997 law approached the Russian world. Russia had grown increasingly
unstable in the years following the collapse of the Soviet Union and was searching for a
new base to situate itself. Billington suggests that the driving factor for state action in
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this time period was, “the search for authority….as newly freed peoples search for unique
identities in a world of creeping technological uniformity and for a source of
responsibility amid the fluidity of freedom, they are rediscovering their own deeper
cultural traditions.”64 The state was seeking to create conditions for stable growth in
Russia, and the best way to foster such was to look back to Russia’s traditional roots of
stability—its Orthodox heritage and a closely-guarded relationship between the
institutional church and the state.
One major effect of this legislation that applied across the board of faith traditions
was the reassertion of government oversight of the ecclesiastical sphere. In the
intervening period from 1990 to 1997, there had been shockingly little government
involvement in religious organizations’ affairs. In sharp contrast to this attitude, “the
1997 law imported a second key concept from the regional religious laws: the restoration
of close regulation of religious life. Gone was the 1990 law’s provision forbidding the
creation of government organs or posts devoted to freedom of conscience issues…”65 A
more Soviet-style system was created wherein religious groups had to register with the
state, providing large amounts of information about their activities, membership, and
finances in exchange for categorization and approval. State bureaucrats could reject
registration applications, and religious groups which failed to register could face
liquidation under article 14 of the new law. The Orthodox Church was never at risk of
failing to meet the requirements of the law—it was, after all, tailor-written to the
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Orthodox situation, but it still faced a greater amount of scrutiny than it had for the past
several years.
The 1997 law, then, can be framed as an Orthodox victory over multiconfessional
forces. Strict new requirements and potential for government oversight would limit the
extent to which oppositional Christian movements could emerge, at least for fifteen or so
years, the term of time for which an organization was required to be active in Russia to
qualify for enrollment as a “religious organization.” Further, organizations had to be able
to document an over 50-year history of activity in Russia to use the word “Russian” in
their name—an incredible requirement considering the wide use of the term by
multinational corportations such as Nestle marketing inside the Russian Federation and
one which functionally restricted this term to the Orthodox Church.66 Many political
scientists concluded that, “passage of the 1997 law On Freedom of Conscience and
Religious Associations signaled the usurpation of Russia’s newly enshrined pluralism by
the old Orthodox-centred model of Russian national identity.”67 The state had recognized
both the value of Orthodoxy as a political tool and the inherent danger in permitting the
continued growth of foreign religious forces to a goal of maintaining stability, controlling
the population, and fostering a greater national identity. The 1997 law has laid the
framework for most church-state interactions in Russia since its passage, including the
growing collaboration between Russian Orthodox Church and government organs. In the
time since, Orthodoxy has come to more profoundly influence both the domestic and the
foreign policy of the Russian government.
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The Orthodox Church and Foreign Policy Post-1997
Since the passage of the 1997 law setting up a framework for church-state
relations, the Orthodox Church has become closely involved in the foreign policy of the
Russian Federation. The goals of the church to re-establish its connections with the
Russian Orthodox diaspora which had split off as the Russian Orthodox Church Outside
of Russia (ROCOR) during the Soviet period and reclaim its lost property overseas
meshed well with the new government’s desire to reassert itself throughout the so-called
russkiy mir (Russian world) and rebuild Russia’s international prestige. Like the Soviet
government following World War II, the Yeltsin and Putin administrations would co-opt
the Orthodox Church to extend their foreign policy vision around the globe. The
Orthodox Church would benefit from this to the extent that its relations with other
Orthodox and the wider Christian communities would improve along with its influence
on world ecumenical affairs. Ecumenical reconciliation has led to a widening of the
Moscow Patriarchate’s flock, a rise in its pre-eminence at international gatherings, a
restoration of church property outside Russia.
Looking back on the period of the late Yeltsin and early Putin administrations, an
increasingly close collaboration between the organized church and the Russian Foreign
Ministry emerged. Daniel Payne, a senior research fellow at the J.M. Dawson Institute of
Church-State Studies at Baylor University, notes that,
During the reign of Alexey II, especially during the Putin administration, the
Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) expanded its role, uniting its mission with that
of the RFM to secure the rights or ‘spiritual security’ of the Russian diaspora as
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well as to reacquire property that had formerly belonged to the Russian Empire
and had been lost during the Communist period.68
The prestige of both the Orthodox Church and the Russian government has been raised
around the world as a result of this collaboration. The utilization of Orthodoxy as a
component of nationalist foreign policy harkens back to the equivalence of Russian
identity and Orthodoxy that has already been addressed in this paper. In effect, “the
church by collaborating with the foreign ministry has signaled that the church is indeed
united with the state in promoting a greater Russia through the spread of Russian
Orthodox Christianity.”69 This symbiotic relationship has been a useful component to
regulate the definition of Russian-ness for the wider diaspora in which both church and
state have taken a great interest.
Payne points out that the conjoining of religion and foreign policy was more a
hallmark of the Putin administration than of Yeltsin; this makes sense in line with
Yeltsin’s previously expressed hesitance to align himself with Orthodoxy over the
democratic ideals of religious freedom. While some collaboration certainly occurred
especially after 1997, the clear point at which this relationship grew deep was the advent
of the Putin administration with its goal to make Russia proud of itself again. The
administration’s approach to the church in foreign policy was clearly laid out in the
National Security Concept of the Russian Federation released in 2000, which stated that,
Assurance of the Russian Federation’s national security also includes protecting
the cultural and spiritual-moral legacy and the historical traditions and standards
of public life, and preserving the cultural heritage of all Russia’s peoples. There
must be a state policy to maintain the population’s spiritual and moral welfare,
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prohibit the use of airtime to promote violence or base instincts, and counter the
adverse impact of foreign religious organizations and missionaries.70
Many of the same forces which drove the adoption of the 1997 law restricting religious
freedom in the Russian Federation can be plainly seen in the language of the concept; the
government saw the dominance of Orthodoxy as far more significant than simply a
religious question, it was a matter of state security that the influence of Orthodoxy on
Russian life be preserved. The Putin administration has in many respects been driven by
a suspicion of any Western influence within their perceived Russian sphere, a point made
evident by the specific reference to foreign religious organizations in the security
concept. Orthodoxy, having been conflated almost completely with Russian identity by
this point, represented a core national value which was at risk from foreign intervention.
Likewise, the spread of Orthodox-based Russian values around the globe became a
strategy which would strengthen and secure the Russian positionothe.

Domestic Policy Post-1997
The influence of the church on Russian policy extends well beyond the realm of
foreign policy. Indeed, in recent history the Orthodox Church’s positions on domestic
policy have attracted far more media attention. Robert C. Blitt of the University of
Tennessee College of Law recently observed that, “the ROC today enjoys unprecedented
influence on virtually every aspect of Russian government policy, an arrangement that
coincides with the vision set out by the Moscow Patriarchate in its Basis of the Social
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Concept.”71 Throughout President Putin’s tenure, the government has grown to pull the
church into nearly everything it does. Government institutions, including longstanding
bodies which had effectively carried over from the Soviet period, adopted their own
unique saints and prayers. New churches were constructed for state-owned buildings.72
This should not necessarily be surprising, considering the circumstances of President
Putin’s own background and inauguration.
A common refrain in Pres. Putin’s biographical notes is that he was unique among
his KBG colleagues during the Soviet period for expressing a personal belief in God.
Throughout his public life in the Russian Federation, Putin has stressed his strong
personal religious faith while paying lip service to the state’s multi-religious character.
At his inauguration in 2000, Patriarch Alexy did not play the same public role that he had
in Yeltsin’s 1996 inauguration, a critical time when church support was instrumental for
defeating a Communist Party challenger to the Presidency.73 However, Putin’s
inauguration was immediately followed by a prayer service at the Cathedral of the
Annunciation in which the Patriarch directed Putin, “‘to remember about the great
responsibility of the leader to his people, history, and God,’ and…to take care of the
people’s welfare, both material and spiritual,” and promised that, “the Russian Orthodox
Church would help the secular authorities in their efforts to revitalise the country.”74
Putin was given three icons, including one of St. Alexander Nevsky, Russia’s famed
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defender and patron saint, with the direction to follow in Nevsky’s noble footsteps. He
left his inauguration with the assertion that, “it was thanks to the guidance of the Russian
Orthodox Church that Russia had preserved century-old traditional spiritual and moral
values, which would have been otherwise irretrievably lost.”75 The tenor for church-state
collaboration in politics was clearly set by this very public exchange between President
Putin and Patriarch Alexy.
One of the most significant areas where the Orthodox Church has sought to make
itself felt domestically is in the realm of military affairs. Like Patriarch Alexy appealing
to the soldiers during the 1991 coup attempt, the church had always enjoyed close ties
with Russian soldiers and a virtual monopoly on their spiritual life. Blitt notes that, “one
of [the] areas where the Church has tirelessly pursued the opportunity to express its views
is access to Russia’s military.”76 A new chaplaincy program championed by Putin would
provide Russia’s traditional faiths with military access, but was set up in such a way that
only the Orthodox Church would be fully able to take advantage of its offerings. For
instance, “the terms governing the chaplaincy program require adherents of a ‘traditional’
religious faith to account for 10 percent of a military unit before the state will authorize
an official chaplain.”77 Based on population figures, this renders it highly unlikely that
Islamic, Jewish, or Buddhist chaplains of any number could find approval to actively
serve as a unit chaplain. Blitt takes the next step to indicate that this means the state
directly pays the Orthodox Church for religious activities; while technically true, this
should be taken with a grain of salt as the practice of military chaplaincy programs is also
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widespread in many other militaries—criticism of bias in Russia’s program ought to be
directed at the adherence percentage requirements, not the pay scale.
Education represents perhaps the most significant area where the church sought to
gain an increased policy role after the passage of the 1997 religious freedom law. With
strong influence on education policy, the church would be in a powerful position to shape
the mindset of future Russian citizens. The church’s Basis of the Social Concept clearly
lay out policy priorities in this area, declaring that,
It is desirable that the entire educational system should be built on religious
principles and based on Christian values…The danger of occult and neo-heathen
influences and destructive sects penetrating into the secular school should not be
ignored either, as under their impact a child can be lost for himself, for his family
and for society…The Church is called and seeks to help school in its educational
mission, for it is the spirituality and morality of a person that determines his
eternal salvation, as well as the future of individual nations and the entire human
race.78
The same fear which directed pressure towards the passage of the 1997 law is here again
evident, couched in ecclesiastical language which connects one’s personal salvation with
the fate of the nation. Education is the baseboard from which the Orthodox Church could
implement its vision for a holy Russia in the 21st century, if only proper access could be
granted. This hope would not be fully realized during the Putin administration, but
church influence would continue to increase and by the time of the Medvedev presidency,
the church and its values had been carved out a place in Russian education.
Overall church influence can be most noticed in Russia on domestic social policy.
As indicated above, education forms a major part of this, but so too do issues such as the
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treatment of homosexuals in Russia or tolerance for religious dissent in the public sphere.
Not so much a problem in the early Putin years, these areas have attracted serious note in
international media over the past several years. The question over gay athletes would
face persecution over attending the Sochi Olympics in 2014, for instance, filled Western
news discussion and social media for days.79 While such policies were not observed in
the Yeltsin and early Putin years, the time period to which this examination has confined
itself, important antecedents emerged at this time. A general trend since 1991 has been
an increase in the power of the church to influence Russian affairs as the state has found
new manners in which to co-opt the church for its own aims. As this process continues to
unfold, Orthodox positions on social issues increasingly become the domestic policy of
the Russian government.

Conclusion
The Russian Orthodox Church has enjoyed a significant resurgence in influence
since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. Already having enjoyed greater freedoms
under Gorbachev, the church was able to act decisively in 1991 to back the Russian
people and new leadership under Boris Yeltsin in the August coup. Patriarch Alexy had
carefully built up connections within the Red Army and exercised remarkable tact in his
public appeals, provoking dramatic responses from the people against the coup
leadership. This impact was perfectly typified by the image of protesters pulling down
Felix Dzerzhinsky’s statue in Lubyanka Square and placing on its pedestal an Orthodox
cross with the words sim pobedishi. Amidst the chaos surrounding the collapse of Soviet
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power, the Russian people were only too willing to fall back on their shared Orthodox
heritage for stability, for comfort, and for group identity.
A profound religious resurgence took place in overwhelmingly atheist Russia
around the early 1990s. Vyacheslav Karpov conceptualizes this process using the term
“ethnodoxy,” suggesting that it was Orthodoxy’s historical connection with Russian
identity and not any real sense of belief that drove this. For much of pre-Soviet history,
Orthodoxy had been intimately wrapped up with the Russian state; both the Patriarchate
and the new government were intensely aware of this and sought to take advantage as
they were trying to develop a new Russian identity in the wake of Soviet collapse.
Religious belief did increase throughout this period, but church power in state affairs
increased to a far greater degree.
The influx of international Christian proselytizing movements brought on by
1990’s religious freedom law created a significant problem for both the government and
the Orthodox Church. The Patriarchate was incensed by fellow Christians attempting to
win converts in their land; they saw Russia as an Orthodox domain and an alreadyChristian realm which did not require such assistance. The government in kind saw the
foreign proselytizers as an avenue for the West to push new ideas into the country which
would undermine Russian unity and risk upsetting the volatile stability. This led to the
passage of a new law in 1997 which severely restricted religious freedom and laid out a
framework for the Orthodox Church and the government to work together on policy
initiatives. The 1997 legislation has remained in force and operated as the guiding
document for church-state relations since this time.
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Under the auspices of the 1997 legislation, the church has become more involved
in both Russian foreign and domestic policy. Appeals to the diaspora to extend Russian
influence have aided both church and state, helping to further the concept of russkiy mir
and extend the soft power of Russia across the globe. Domestically, the Orthodox
Church has pursued closer involvement in both military affairs and education policy—
two areas where a profound impact can be had shaping the character of the country and
its future citizens. Rooting education in Orthodox values is meant to inculcate that these
values are a part of Russian identity, not only of Orthodox belief. In each of these areas,
the church’s policy initiatives can be seen as an extension of the overarching goal to
coalesce a new Russian identity around the Orthodox faith and history.
The Russian government and the Orthodox Church have built up a new type of
relationship since the fall of communism in 1991. This new symphonia is rooted in
shared goals for control of the population and influence in the new Russian state and the
world. Careful effort has been put into building up Russian identity around the tenets of
Orthodoxy while avoiding the official state establishment of the religion and professing
publicly a state policy of multiconfessional religious freedom. With each successive
presidential administration, the relationship between the church the state only seems to
grow closer as the state becomes willing to support more and more church policy
priorities and the church moves to endorse new state initiatives which do not conflict with
its teachings. Orthodoxy has become a core component of modern Russian identity by a
long process of careful design on the part of both Patriarchs and Presidents.
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